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THE FOURTEEN FACES OF NARROWNESS:
HOW COURTS LEGITIMIZE WHAT
THEY DO
R. George Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION

Of all the central legal concepts the judicial system relies on,

which are the most crucial to its effectiveness as an institution? The
following concepts might all be thought of as somehow crucial to the
legal system: justiciability;1 jurisdiction; 2 adversariness;3 predictability;4 incrementalism or holding and dicta;5 enforceable liability; reasonableness, objectivity, and the reasonable person standard;7 stare

* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. The
author thanks Richard Fallon, Lisa Kloppenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Mark Tushnet, Eugene Volokh, and Kary Wolfe for their suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Peter Gordon Ingram, Justiciability,39 AM. J. JURIS. 353 (1994).
2. See, e.g., ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION (2d ed. 1994);
Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality,Time, and the Legal Imagination,23 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the
Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1983); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, MulticulturalWorld, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Predictionand the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 651 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium,108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Precedentand Legal Authority: A Critical
History, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 771; Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition,
99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. RaV. 571
(1987).
6. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Richard A.
Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv.
1717 (1982).
7. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJEcTrIvrrY (1992); Heidi Li
Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1187 (1994); Stephen
G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula,80 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994).
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decisis;8 reviewability; 9 separation of powers;"0 federalism;" impartiality, neutrality, or due process;12 consent; 3 fundamental rights, possibly
including autonomy or property rights; 4 compelling governmental in6 privacy;" personhood;' 8 liberty
terests;15 equal protection of the laws;'
2
2
interests;'9 responsibility; 0 efficiency; 1 republicanism or constitutionalism;2
8. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudi-

cation, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031

(1996).
9. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The JudicialReview Game, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 382 (1993); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumptionof Reviewability: A
Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743
(1992).
10. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139
U. PA. L. REV.1513 (1991); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, 105
YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking,
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343 (1989); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If
Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of
Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991).

11. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971); Symposium: The New
FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES.L. REV. 635 (1996).
Roland Pennock & John Chap12. See, e.g., 18 NoMos: DUE PROCESS (J.
man eds., 1977); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a

DignitaryTheory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981).
13. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT (1993); Onora O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 252 (1985); R. George Wright, ConsentingAdults: The Problemof Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1397 (1995).
14. See, e.g., LAWRENCE HAWORTH, AUTONOMY (1986); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975)(1859); JOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND
NEGATIVE AND POsrrIVE LIBERTY (1986).

15. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An
Essential but Unanalyzed Term in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv.
917 (1988).
16. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991); ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITrrIONALISM:

RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUR-

TEENTH AMEND-MENT (1994); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern EqualProtection,90 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1991).

17. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); William L.

Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
18. See, e.g., R.S. DOwNiE & ELIZABETH TELFER, RESPECT FOR PERSONS
(1969); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM

(1990);

DEREK PARFiT, REASONS

AND

PERSONS (1984); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 957 (1982).
19. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW:

THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION (1996); MILL, supra note 14.
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and state action.23
These concepts arise in different contexts and at differing levels
of generality. Some are mainly institutional, operational, or procedural-others mainly substantive, normative, and outcome-oriented.
The legal system itself uses all of these concepts internally, as opposed to concepts such as sovereign authority 24 and legitimacy,'
which might be used to describe or judge the legal system from the
outside.
Although important concepts, none of them satisfactorily links
the workings and outcomes of the legal system to the system's legitimacy. Certainly, due process and consent help to legitimize legal
outcomes. But they cannot do all the necessary work. Some of the
concepts actually perform little legitimizing work by themselves. For
example, pointing out that the judicial system commonly features incremental decision-making hardly sells the judicial system to the
public. It invites the question of what makes incrementalism a good
thing. Other concepts, such as fundamental rights or compelling governmental interests, may be formally or logically basic. Fundamental
rights certainly sound important. But these concepts are simply too
abstract and, until fleshed out, too empty to be practically crucial in
20. See, e.g.,

JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING:

ESSAYS IN THE

THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (1970);
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); MICHAEL S. MOORE,
ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL LAw (1993); Bailey Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal

Responsibility in the Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893 (1990).
21. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
(1993); Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1987 (1996); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980).
22. See, e.g., 20 NoMos: CONSTITUTIONALISM (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1979); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION
(1993); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).

23. See, e.g., Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 49-71 (1996).

24. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1970); Kai Nielsen, State Authority and
Legitimization,in ON POLITICAL OBLIGATION (Paul Harris ed., 1990); Heidi M.
MORALITY (1979); 12 NoMos: POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 218

Hurd, ChallengingAuthority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991).
25. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy
trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973); Nielsen, supra note 24; Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Frances Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil Disobedience, 18 GA.
L. REv. 929 (1984).
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legitimizing the legal system. Other, less obviously central legal concepts must instead do this crucial legitimizing work, and it is these
less celebrated legal concepts that in practice turn out to be crucial
for the legal system's legitimacy.
The legitimization project may start with concrete and substantive concepts, such as due process, consent, autonomy, privacy, efficiency, or equal protection. These, however, can only carry the system-legitimizing process so far. While these concepts are sufficiently
concrete or normative, they are openly, notoriously, and perhaps irresolvably controversial. These concepts thus cannot complete the
work of legitimizing the legal system. The public divides over the
proper normative value of ideas such as autonomy 6 and efficiency,"
and consciously realizes that it disagrees on the proper scope or
meaning of the rights of privacy' and equal protection of the laws.29
The public is too keenly aware of its divisions on these concepts
and of the persisting, if not intractable, character of the debate. At
this point, genuinely novel and widely convincing broad arguments
regarding these legal concepts are difficult to construct. Many consider the courts, even the United States Supreme Court, as merely
one more participant, albeit an unusually powerful one, in these ongoing debates. At least to those unsympathetic to the results, courts
may appear to have the last word, but rarely the best word, on these
matters.
Typically, courts relying on overtly controversial visions of
autonomy, privacy, equal protection, and the like do not convince
many of the power of the courts' arguments. The courts' discussion
of these categories does not commonly legitimize or cast authority
over their decisions. Other concepts, therefore, must crucially complete the work of judicial legitimization. Here, the humble, mundane
legal concept of breadth and narrowness often performs the crucial
work in legitimizing the legal system.
26. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); RONALD
DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION:
AN
EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

ARGUMENT

ABOUT

ABORTION,

(1993).

27. See sources cited supra note 21.
28. See sources cited supra notes 17,26.
29. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2581 (1996); RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND
OTHER APOCALYPTIC TALES OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
WELFARE (1996); CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T
Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFRMATIVE ACrION (1997); ALBERT G.
MOSLEY & NICHOLAS CAPALDI, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR
UNFAIR PREFERENCE?

(1996).
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II. LEGITIMIZATION AND THE IDEAS OF
BREADTH AND NARROWNESS

A. The Process of Legitimization

The idea of legitimization is understandable in plain terms. For
example, as one writer phrases the issue: "The question of legitimacy
is, quite simply, why should the nation-lawyers or laypeoplecontinue to respect and follow the constitutional meanings articulated by as few as five individuals who happen to sit on the Supreme
Court?"' The following discussion of legitimacy includes not only
constitutional decisionmaking, but also other forms of judicial decisionmaking and the legal system as a whole. The discussion will not
focus on the normative question of whether the judicial system is
really legitimate or deserves its authority. Rather, the focus is on the
descriptive question of how the judicial system generates its perceived legitimacy. In other words, how does judicial decisionmaking
succeed, rightly or wrongly, in seeming legitimate or rationally and
morally justified?
The process of constructing judicial legitimacy involves both intentional and unintentional elements. Legal actors may consciously
seek to legitimize the judicial system and its effects. However, legal
actors may also generate legitimacy through mechanisms whose effects the actors may not have intended or even fully grasped.
Concepts such as privacy, autonomy, equality, and efficiency can
do some of the work of legitimization but remain too overtly controversial to do all of the work. Admittedly, these concepts also have
some descriptive element. One can imagine drawing on both the descriptive components of these ideas and on their normative components. In practice, however, the courts can only rarely support an interesting judicial result involving, for example, privacy issues .by
reference solely to descriptive aspects of privacy. The public is only
too keenly aware of this unbridged gulf between observable descriptive fact and the normative legal outcome.
Probably no legal concept really allows for the rigorous drawing
of interesting judicial outcomes from purely descriptive or observable

30. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More Honest Than Ever Before: Abandoning

Pretense and Recreating Legitimacy in ConstitutionalInterpretation,1995 U. ILL.

L. REV. 363, 364; see also Olsen, supra note 25, at 951 ("In the context of law,
[legitimization] is the process by which laws and the coercion exercised in their
name come to seem fair.").
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phenomena.3 ' But the crucial point is that some legal categories provide a smoother, less recognizable illusion in this regard than others.
Thus, while all transitions from description or observation to a normative legal conclusion involve some sleight of hand, not all concepts
equally lend themselves to this process with credibility.
Legitimacy calls for the least jarring transition from judicial description to evaluation, and here, ideas such as privacy and autonomy
help little. Indeed, they wave the red flag of controversy. Instead,
the smoothest transition from judicial description to judicial result
relies on other sorts of categories entirely. For a smoother transition
from description to judicial rule, one would instead rely on concepts
that seem readily and uncontroversially measurable, but which also
have some normative bite, though not of an immediately recognizable or controversial sort. The most generally serviceable and most
important of these are the concepts of narrowness and breadth.
Before focusing on narrowness and breadth, the practical importance of making the least conspicuous transitions from the observable
to the valuable deserves emphasis. A legal system could seek legitimacy by endlessly trumpeting the moral superiority of its decisions.
This strategy may hold some value, but decreasingly so in a society of
increasing moral pluralism. A few concepts, such as courage in battle
for example, may seem to combine neatly the descriptive and the
evaluative, but legal concepts neatly combining description and
evaluation do not seem common or central. A better strategy,
whether consciously chosen or not, would begin with seemingly uncontroversial empirical observations and would continue by drawing
out apparently well-founded normative legal implications. How long
this kind of illusion can persist depends upon many factors, including
the subtlety and apparent innocence of the necessary transitions.
The process of legitimization is not about outmuscling, outvoting, or outshouting anyone else. Rather, it attempts to appear unobjectionable or as close to unobjectionable as possible. What is objectively describable or measurable is normally considered real.
Theories approximating some underlying reality often receive greater
acceptance.32 At the very least, theories receive ratings based on
31. Such a skeptical belief is famously associated with the philosopher David
Hume. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. 1, § 1, at
507 (Ernest G. Mossner ed., Penguin ed. 1969); see also ROBERT NozICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 535 (1981) (discussing the distinction between
facts and values).
32 See, e.g., GERALD HOLTON, EINSTEIN, HISTORY, AND OTHER PASSIONS
(1995); PHILIP KrrcHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT
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their empirical adequacy.3 One has confidence in something repeatedly seen and measured. If an inference follows logically from what
is seen or measured, one also has confidence in that inference.
Thus, the legitimacy of a judicial system crucially depends on inconspicuous, typically uncontested transitions from the supposedly
observable or the measurable to conclusions with more obvious
evaluative import. In the judicial system, this transition is made most
smoothly and most commonly through the concepts of narrowness
and breadth.
B. The Metaphors of Narrowness and Breadth

Narrowness and breadth are concepts relied on throughout the
law. Narrowness and breadth in the law are, of course, metaphors. 34
But they are obvious, natural, and typically uncontroversial metaphors. What they are built upon-the more literal narrowness and
breadth of, for example, lines or areas-is the uncontroversiality of
simple geometry, road construction, pen line widths, land surveying,
bottle openings, real estate lots, and surface area measurements.35
There are optical illusions and unsystematic errors in measuring narrowness and breadth, even with sophisticated instruments. But for
the most part, determinations of breadth and narrowness in the literal, geometrical context are uncontroversial. Normally, claims that
A is narrower than B in the literal, Euclidean geometrical setting do
not generate conflicting and unresolved schools of thought.
Whether one patch of grass is narrower than another is thus
typically a matter of a quick visual inspection that any number of persons can perform equally well. In such a case, alternative geometries
do not come into play. Measurements of geometrical narrowness and
LEGEND, OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS

(1993);

THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST

WORD (1997); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY

(1995).

33. See, e.g., BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE (1980).

34. For the suspiciousness of legal metaphors in general, see David A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1205 (1991) (reviewing
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE

(1990)); Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 812 (1935); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under
Color of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 331 & nn.36-37 (1992) (citing Justice Cardozo in Berkey v. ThirdAve. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
35. For discussion of related metaphors, see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 29 (1980) (discussing the metaphorical use
of the idea of land area) and GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 517 (1987) (referring
to the metaphor of discourse space as physical space).
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breadth are so commonly done that they do not automatically raise
suspicions about the use of the terms narrowness and breadth
throughout the law. The usage seems familiar and, if only an analogy, still an uncontroversial and untroubling one. Accordingly,
courts maintaining that one legal rule, holding, or interpretation is
narrower than another, do not immediately raise suspicions. Courts
may make mistakes, and fudging even occurs occasionally, but narrowness and breadth in the law ordinarily do not provide grounds for
principled contest.
The lulling effect of the analogy to uncontroversial literal measurements of geometric width explains this reaction. However, this
analogy to geometrical width is, in reality, deeply flawed. Judicial
judgments of relative breadth and narrowness are often in themselves
richly value-laden. Narrowness and breadth in the law typically involve much more than an incontestable counting or measurement.
Instead, legal judgments that one rule is narrower than another often
depend crucially on what should be hair-raisingly controversial normative judgments and on deep evaluations that are not remotely akin
to observations. This holds true even assuming that empirical observations and physical measurements involve some limited degree of
value judgment and normative choice. To the extent that the public
does not consciously recognize this whenever it occurs, the public itself is involved in the legal system's self-legitimization.
Typically, one patch of ground is unequivocally narrower than
another. The value judgments, if any, involved in such measurements
are of modest import. This familiar result cannot typically be carried
over into the law. Determining whether one possible legal rule is
narrower than another requires more than a yardstick. Rather, the
determination often requires practically important value assumptions
that might well be controversial. Rule A may be narrower than Rule
B on what seem, arguably, decisive criteria. But in light of different
and perhaps equally interesting criteria, it may also be equally possible to argue that Rule B is actually narrower than Rule A. Often,
this possibility remains unseen because of the misleading character of
the metaphor of breadth and narrowness.
Until there exists some agreed-upon set of normative and descriptive rules, legal judgments of narrowness and breadth will remain largely arbitrary and susceptible to conscious or unconscious
manipulation. Judicial legitimization occurs when arbitrariness and
bias close the unrecognized gap between the analogy of largely objective measurement and the deeply value-laden legal outcome.
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Without those subjective normative judgments, legal breadth and
narrowness are indeterminate. Thus, a determinate legal outcome is
36
often reached only through judicial arbitrariness.
The suppressed evaluative nature of legal narrowness and
breadth will be discussed below. For now, it is understandable how
the metaphor of narrowness and breadth leads to the oversimplification of legal issues. Thinking about a patch of ground, for example,
does not ordinarily include thinking of the patch changing its breadth
over time. However, it will sometimes be quite sensible to think of a
rule's relative breadth changing with time and circumstance.
More important, however, is the tendency of the narrowness and
breadth metaphor to suppress recognizing the need for value judgments. The very ideas of breadth and narrowness each direct attention to scope, area, counting, and numbers. These concepts suffice
for measuring geographical width, but not for most legal inquiries.
Yet this basic point is typically overlooked.
In a way, this mistake is understandable. In reality, the elements
of legal breadth and narrowness are surprisingly complicated when
compared with the simplicity of most area measurements. Legal
breadth may be considered in any number of respects. The most obvious approaches would consider the total number of cases within the
scope of the rule, the different kinds of cases and probabilities within
the rule, the difference between actual and potential cases, and the
significance or seriousness of the cases. It is unclear, for example,
whether a rule encompassing many cases is actually broader than a
rule encompassing fewer cases, if the latter rule sweeps in a greater
number of different parties, a greater variety of parties, or a greater
number of kinds of cases.
For example, which is broader, a rule affecting many persons of
a single kind, or a rule affecting fewer persons of varying and unpredictable types? Concretely, which is broader, a rule encompassing
600 major league baseball players, or a rule encompassing 500 randomly selected federal income tax payers? Is Professor Fred Schauer
correct in stating that the rule "'Write thank you notes' is less general
than 'Show appreciation for social kindnesses?"' 31 This is certainly
correct if writing thank you notes is merely one way of showing appreciation. But what if thank you notes are sometimes intended to
36. For a brief discussion of the link between indeterminacy and legal legitimacy, see Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV.283, 285-87 (1989)
and Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481 (1995).
37. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 639 (1995).
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solidify a relationship, enhance the likelihood of a job offer, wangle a
future invitation, and so forth? Is the relationship of greater and
lesser generality still clear?
It becomes important not to lose sight of the bigger picture amid
this complexity. Mere quantitative approaches to legal narrowness
and breadth are complicated, but additional complexity and controversy is suppressed if the legal system is allowed to submerge the
valuational aspects of legal narrowness and breadth." There may be
a substantial payoff in legitimacy through pretending that judicial
judgments of narrowness and breadth are indeed quantifiable.
In contrast, a legal system sometimes tries to legitimize itself
through "mystification," or pretending that its work is more complex
than it really is. Accordingly, the ersatz complexity tends to render
the legal system immune from outside critique. At other times, a legal system tries to legitimize itself by pretending that its work is simpler, more straightforward, and less contestable than it really is.
Here, the concern for the manipulation of breadth and narrowness
comes into play.
One final preliminary clarification: one might be tempted to
generalize that courts legitimize themselves through narrow rulings
rather than broad rulings, because narrow rulings arguably reflect
judicial institutional competence and avoid usurping democratic
authority. Conversely, legislatures might be thought to legitimize
themselves with broad statutes, on the theory that breadth in statutes
promotes equality and helps avoid favoritism and partiality.
There are important exceptions to the generalization that courts
legitimize themselves through narrowness and legislatures through
breadth. For example, a court that insists on a series of narrow
holdings in racial equality cases involving public schools could well
undercut, rather than enhance, its legitimacy. Case holdings on racial
equality that are narrow and contextualized may suggest that the
court simply does not grasp or accept the broad principles of racial
fairness. In contrast, a broad statute in many contexts may appear
crude, ill-considered, unduly ambitious, or insensitive.
In any event, contrasting judicial and legislative roles is not the
38. For a brief discussion of the relative "ease" of supposedly observationbased-as opposed to overtly evaluative and controversial-legal judgments, see
Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism,94 MICH. L. REv. 1422, 1447 (1996)

(reviewing

ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:

COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT

DEMOCRACY,

(1995)). For a brief reference to the jeopardizing

of legitimacy through controversial constitutional value judgments, see Jacobs,

supranote 30, at 365-66.
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central point. Searching for an optimal or ideal level of narrowness
or breadth in judicial holdings is not the point either. Rather, the
point is simply that whether courts issue narrow or broad rulings,
they can use the very concepts of narrowness and breadth to add a
bogus objectivity to their analysis. The metaphors of narrowness and
breadth encourage the belief that courts measure uncontroversially
or objectively, when instead they actually make and rely upon important, potentially controversial value judgments.

III. THE FOURTEEN ASSOCIATIONS OF BREADTH AND
NARROWNESS
To grasp how narrowness and breadth are useful for legitimization, exploring how this concept is used in various legal contexts becomes important. Some of these uses and associations are flawed or
questionable. But even so, they shed light on how narrowness and
breadth actually function in the law. The fourteen associations of
breadth and narrowness are set out immediately below. Some of
these associations will receive further development in Section IV.
To begin, narrowness is often associated with uncontroversiality,
consensus, or nonintrusiveness 9 Narrow grounds are often perceived as uncontroversial grounds. Thus, the narrowest of various
opinions issued in a case would be perceived as the tamest, most evidently legitimate, or most widely acceptable opinion.
Second, narrowness is sometimes linked with clarity. For example, one scholar states that "[t]he plain meaning rule expresses the
principle that where the statute is narrowly and tightly drawn, the
courts have considerably less interpretive flexibility than when the
statute is phrased in vague or general terms."' Here, narrowness
39. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (decision on narrower and non-constitutional

grounds as avoiding explosive "clashes" between branches of government);
Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 133-34 (6th Cir. 1994); Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003, 1016
(1994) (discussing the logic of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.

288, 341-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When
the Court Divides: Reconsideringthe PrecedentialValue of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 434 (1992) (discussing consensus in the logic

of Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Perhaps it is differences in
the relative controversiality of the rules that lead Dean Edward Levi to conclude
that an invitee or implied warranty theory is narrower than a theory that an ob-

ject is or is not imminently dangerous. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 16 (1949).
40. Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990
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does not necessarily equate with clarity or precision, but rather asserts some loose association. Of course, some very broad general
rules-as found in high school science-can be stated with great precision, and it is possible to imagine narrow, limited rules that are remarkably vague, ambiguous, and create many borderline cases.
Sometimes, a narrow case holding merely preserves an already existing state of legal confusion and uncertainty. Anyone who denies that
narrow rules can be vague, and general rules precise, may be relying
on their own definitions of these terms, rather than observing how
the courts and the legal community use these terms.
Some standard manipulations of constitutional law and statutory
interpretation allow courts to pare down apparently broad grants of
authority to much narrower proportions.4' Much of this narrowing is
uncontroversial. For example, the command "close the door" is
usually interpreted as the narrower command to "close the door now,
reversibly, and without unnecessary noise." Narrowing apparently
broad grants of authority is sometimes more controversial, but still
defensible by an appeal to widely shared values. In other cases, the
narrowing process sacrifices the intent of the statutory drafters to the
values of the narrowing judges. It is wrong to suppose that a move
from broad language to narrow language gains precision and clarity,
and increasingly limits any interpreting judge's scope of discretion.
Statutory narrowness and breadth do not respectively constrain and
free judges. Instead, judges manipulate the categories of narrowness
and breadth to reach and legitimize judicial outcomes.
Third, some presume that a connection exists between liberal or
progressive politics and the breadth of a judicial interpretation.
Admittedly, a familiar canon of statutory construction urges a broad
WIs. L. REv. 1179, 1199. For a discussion of the idea of the breadth of legislative

delegation through the concept of vagueness or amorphousness, see David
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224-25 (1984). Also, the idea of narrowness is sometimes
associated with reducing vagueness in the context of the death penalty. See
People v. Bacigalupo, 6 Cal. 4th 457, 465, 862 P.2d 808, 812, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808,
812 (1993) (en banc). For the utterly equivocal relation between the narrowness
of a case holding and the resulting clarity of the law, see Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).

41. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Kent v. Dulles, 357

U.S. 116 (1958).
42. For discussion, see Geoffrey Marshall, Theorizing About the Judicial

Role, in LEGAL THEORY MEETS LEGAL PRACrICE 73-78 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed.,
1988). Of course, breadth of interpretation is sometimes also equated with liberality in a non-political sense. See JOHN BELL & GEORGE ENGLE, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 32 n.3 (2d ed. 1987).
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or liberal interpretation to effect the statute's purpose.4 3 However,
this argument depends on a world view that assumes statutes tend to
be politically liberal or progressive in comparison with the results
that judges and juries would otherwise reach. This view oversimplifies a world in which statutory welfare reform and immigration reform currently mean validating middle class grievances.
Fourth, some link is often assumed between administrative adjudication and narrowness on the one hand, and between administrative rulemaking and breadth on the other. However, upon inspection, this association unravels quickly. The results of administrative
agency rulemaking typically may indeed seem broader than the results of administrative agency adjudications or case holdings.' But
narrow agency rules and broad agency case holdings are also easily
envisionable. Which is narrower, a statute or rule affecting the taxation of only a few past transactions in a single concentrated industry,
or the adjudication known as Brown v. Board of Education?4 One
could, however, just as easily make the opposite error, and believe
that agency rules are narrower than adjudications." Instead, one
should simply recognize that the legal forms of adjudication and
rulemaking do not significantly constrain the judge's choice between
narrow and broad legal outcomes.
Fifth, narrowness and breadth are often associated with the vertical level or rank in the structural hierarchy of the law of a particular
legal holding. For example, a decision based on statutory or administrative regulatory grounds is presumed narrower than a decision on
constitutional grounds. Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority47 exemplifies this understanding. Section IV below further discusses Ashwander, but it suffices for the

43. See 3

NORMAN I. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION

§§ 58.04,58.06 (5th ed. 1992).

44. This assumption appears in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 682 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (discussing the logic of the plurality opinion in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon

Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969)) (discussing adjudication as focusing narrowly on

the behavior of particular parties).
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Further, the brief per curiam opinions issued on the
strength of Brown cover facilities that are utterly unrelated to public school education. See, e.g., Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam)
(discussing the desegregation of city golf courses).
46. See NationalPetroleum, 482 F.2d at 690. ("[R]ules, as contrasted with the
holdings reached by case-by-case adjudication, are more specific as to their
scope.").
47. 297 U.S. 288,347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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moment to point out that a broad statutory holding can be broader
than a narrow constitutional holding, even assuming that statutes are
narrower than the constitutional provisions that authorize them.
Office of PersonnelManagement v. Richmonl provides instruction in this regard. The Richmond Court apparently could have decided the case on the narrow equitable grounds that Richmond's
particular circumstances did not give rise to estoppel against the government.49 Instead, the Court decided the case on constitutional
grounds, invoking the Appropriations Clause." Interestingly, the
Court characterized the constitutional route as the "narrower ground
of decision."'" Arguably, a potentially broad equitable rule is indeed
broader than a constitutional rule construing the modest, if not obscure, Appropriations Clause. But this debate again demonstrates
the manipulability of such judicial judgments, which the descriptive
character of the concept of narrowness and breadth supposedly constrains.
Sixth, narrowness is commonly linked to the sheer number of
statutes or other laws that a given judicial decision affects. The narrowest ruling is said either to uphold or strike down the fewest laws
in the face of a constitutional challenge.' This idea requires, first,
settling upon a relevant time period for counting, and second, actually counting the affected laws. Does 42 U.S.C. section 1983 count as
one law? Is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act one law? Which
then is narrower: striking down section 1983 on constitutional
grounds or striking down several different sections of a state's securities code on the same constitutional grounds? Even if the counting
problems are solved, should not the importance or triviality of the
laws in question be considered? Narrowness and breadth in the law
is not just a matter of counting but of significance as well.
Seventh, sometimes the idea of narrowness may actually play
only a small role in the statements which invoke it. In such cases, the
reference to narrowness is close to redundant, in that it is not obvious
how the statement would be affected by deleting its reference to narrowness. Take, for example, the familiar rule of lenity in construing
48. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
49. See i4- at 423-24.

50. See id at 424; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.

51. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 423.
52. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 47 (1993); see also Max
Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV.863, 880-82 (1930) (discussing
various statutory interpretation methods).
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criminal statutes. A court might formulate the rule along these lines:
the statute will be interpreted narrowly so as to avoid holding a
defendant's conduct within its scope.' But what really changes if the
word 'narrowly' is struck from the rule? How is this rule different
from merely interpreting the statute to exclude the defendant's conduct? The idea of narrowing itself seems superfluous here because a
court can exclude the defendant through a statutory interpretation
that broadly and unnecessarily includes many more future defendants.
Eighth, breadth is sometimes linked explicitly to the idea of importance. A delegation of legislative authority to an agency, for example, may be thought improperly broad if the powers bestowed are
considered too important to delegate.54 Whatever its defects, this
view highlights the value elements of legal breadth, beyond those of
mere quantity. As a result, this view is actually less useful for purposes of judicial legitimization.
Ninth, narrowing and broadening are techniques which the
courts use to move away from the legal baseline they have been given
or have chosen in a given kind of case. In death penalty cases, for example, the judicially chosen baseline currently is one of broad eligibility of defendants for death, with the class of eligibles then subsequently narrowed.55 Courts do not start with the presumption that no
one should be executed and then rebut that presumption through
broadening. The number of executions thus reflects not only the initial eligibility baseline, but the degree to which the courts order or
permit narrowing or broadening from that baseline.
The Supreme Court has sometimes read congressional grants of
authority more narrowly than Congress might have intended. In
some cases, the Court's narrowing technique leads to attractive case
results without technically raising any constitutional issues. Thus, by
deft narrowing of apparently broad congressional language, the
Court has expanded the rights of aliens to seek federal civil service

53. See, e.g., United States v. Brummels, 15 F.3d 769, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1994).
For similar usages, see Weaver v. USIA, 87 F.3d 1429, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1996) and
Judith Resnick, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1715 (1991).
54. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive PolicyMaking: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS.

46, 62 (1976)

(discussing the views of Alexander Bickel).
55. See People v. Bacigalupo, 6 Cal. 4th 457, 862 P.2d 808, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
808 (1993) (en banc).
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jobs56 and has limited the grounds upon which citizens can be denied
passports.' While the Court in these cases is undeniably making interesting, important value judgments, it is claiming merely to ascertain and describe congressional intent. Thus, the Court largely avoids
potentially divisive battles over the scope and value of constitutional
rights, and thereby enhances judicial legitimacy.
Tenth, narrowness is often associated with both an inclusive set
of assumedly relevant case facts and a rule that is merely a subset of
some broader rule. A narrow rule, for example, is sometimes a lesser
rule entirely included within some broader rule. While the broader
rule may encompass the narrower, the opposite cannot be true. Accordingly, if one accepts the broader rule, it is thought that one must,
as a matter of logic, accept the included narrower rule. Of course,
competing possible rules often do not fall into this neat relationship.
Commonly, competing possible rules only partially overlap. The
most interesting cases are those in which an apparently lesser included rule is in fact not entirely so included, such that a judge could
accept the putative broad rule while quite sensibly rejecting what is
alleged to be the narrower included rule.58 The potential for judicial
manipulation, and for fallacy-ridden legitimization, can be dramatic
in such cases.
Eleventh, narrowness is famously associated with a degree of
tailoring or fit. A remedy is thought "narrowly tailored" if it matches
or corresponds to the contours of the problem. Such a remedy ideally addresses all aspects of the problem, but does not extend beyond
the scope of the problem. The underinclusiveness and the overinclusiveness of the remedy are minimized.59 Here, it should be obvious
how the geographic "area" metaphor can seriously mislead. It is
56. See Hampton, 426 U.S. at 113 n.46 (1976) (requiring a clearer congressional or presidential statement of broad authority for the Civil Service Commission before the adverse impact on aliens' interests can be found legitimate).
57. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (presuming only a narrow

grant of authority to deny passports, given the significance of the right to travel,
without technically reaching the controversial issue of the scope and importance
of a constitutional right to travel).

58. Classically, for example, John Locke argued that the alleged right to take
a soldier's personal property was not a "narrow" right included within the presumed "broader" right to order the certain death of that soldier. See JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 139 (Second Treatise) (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1698). For a careful discussion of narrowing, broadening, and overruling in terms of additions, deletions, and clarifications of assertedly relevant facts, see Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 19-25 (1989).
59. See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring,43 UCLA L. REv. 1781, 1786 (1996).
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questionable, for example, whether underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness are always equally bad. Additionally, imagine trying to
determine which of two possible rules is more narrowly tailored
where Rule A involves some underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness, but not as much as Rule B. Does that lead to the conclusion
that Rule A is more narrowly tailored?
The answer is no. This geographic metaphor has not yet taken
into account the values, and in particular the moral seriousness or
constitutional severity, of the issues that underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness may be involved in determining. Rule A may unfairly
cost a dozen innocent victims their jobs or their lives, while Rule B
costs a hundred somewhat less innocent victims a dollar each. This
does not seem irrelevant to the degree of tailoring of these rules.
And it remains unresolved whether burdens on constitutionally protected rights-and not on other important practical interestsrepresent the only factors in the narrow tailoring determination. If
courts are allowed to pretend that narrow tailoring is only a matter of
largely value-free measuring and comparison, their decisions can
avoid the deepest sorts of criticism.
Twelfth, the spatial metaphor of narrowness and breadth has
implications for the dimension of time involved in judicial decisionmaking. Given popular recognition of the close relationship between
physical space and time, it is not surprising that narrow judicial decisionmaking often tends to shift decisionmaking power into the future
or to other actors, where broader rulings tend to shift the balance of
decisionmaking power to the present.' On the other hand, unnecessarily broad rules may beg to be overruled in their entirety, thereby
limiting their own influence over time."
60. See Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the Size of ConstitutionalDe-

cisions, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 543, 555 (1996) ("Justice Stevens properly recognizes

that deciding cases according to broad rules necessarily involves deciding cases
prematurely."); Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 591 (1987)

(arguing that broad precedents have greater constraining power); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured ConstitutionalSteps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 301 (1996) ("[n]arrow
rulings may give more deference to administrative decisionmakers or other constitutional interpreters, thus promoting a sharing of power.").
61. See Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a
Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736, 741-43
(1993). By contrast, narrow incremental rule changes may set up slippery slopes
eventually carrying us great distances. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MAKING SENSE OF HUMANrrY 213-23 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes,
99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985) (discussing logical and empirical presuppositions of
slippery slope arguments).
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Further, narrow rulings may have broad and serious effects.
Suppose the Supreme Court accepts a case involving thousands of
prisoners alleging Eighth Amendment violations, but then, as its term
is concluding, dismisses the case on narrow procedural grounds quite
apart from the underlying merits. This may mean that the prisoners
suffer another year of unconstitutional treatment-a more severe effect than any number of broad prisoners' rights holdings on the merits might have caused, even over time. The Court's decision to decline hearing a case on narrow grounds can sometimes exert
enormous power-albeit disguised as judicial modesty. 2
Thirteenth, narrowness and breadth lie at the heart of the judicial choice between abstract, generalized descriptions of case facts as
opposed to concrete, detailed, or perhaps selective fact descriptions.
By manipulating the narrowness and breadth of a description, and
thus the level of generality, an event can be made to seem either reasonably foreseeable or wildly improbable. A defendant's liability in
negligence may depend on this typically unacknowledged judicial
choice. As well, the choice between broad or narrow descriptions is
sometimes crucial at the constitutional level, ' as seen in the debate
between Justices Brennan and Scalia over how generally or specifically to formulate litigants' interests before characterizing their constitutional status. 5 In the absence of a dissenting opinion on point, a
judge can manipulate the outcome of one case to seem "natural" by
deftly characterizing the interests at stake. Similarly, a judge's degree of concern for the facts of particular cases may also affect the
breadth or narrowness of the opinion in cases involving statutory interpretation.66
Finally, narrowness is sometimes associated not only with judicial modesty and deference to future decisionmakers, but with sheer
indeterminacy. For example, Ronald Dworkin refers to "the narrow62- See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (the Court's

narrowly justified establishment of a broad power of judicial review).

63. See J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 197, 21215 (1990).
64. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (stating that the clarity of
an area of law depends upon the narrowness or breadth of the principles sought);

Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent ConstitutionalTheory, 83 MICH. L.
REv.1502, 1514 (1985) (discussing the difficulties of defining a level of generality

for use by the court).
65. Contrast the opinions of Justices Brennan and Scalia in Michael H. v.
GeraldD., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
66. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., PublicValues in Statutory Interpretation,137
U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1081 (1989).

November 1997]

FOURTEENFACES OFNARROWNESS

67
est decision in Roe: that the Texas statute was unconstitutional.
Merely holding a state statute unconstitutional is narrow in a sense,
because such a holding does not commit the Court to any particular
theory should the Court evaluate similar statutes from other states.
But such a holding may just as easily be characterized as merely unclear or indeterminate as to its scope. It is compatible with any number of possible rulings and rationales, of varying breadth, in future

cases.

After all, even a narrow holding aspires to rationality. Even a
narrow holding covers not only the case at bar, but by implication, all
.other relevantly similar cases. A narrow holding does not tell us how
to treat many other sorts of circumstances. If a holding is really
thought to cover only the immediate case, and no other determinate
or indeterminate set of relevantly similar cases, it is not a reasoned
decision. It is instead a logically isolated act-like an impulsive preference for a walnut ice cream cone without any suggestion that one
would again prefer walnut ice cream under any particular circumstance.
All judicial decisions that pretend to rationality must therefore
aspire to some breadth, however indeterminate. A narrow decision
of the sort that Dworkin describes can be viewed not only as an act of
judicial modesty and self-restraint, but as merely playing one's cards
close to one's judicial vest. The Court's narrow holding today may be
an investment in the Court's own freedom of decisionmaking
tomorrow.
IV. THE FOURTEEN FACES IN CONTEXT
A. Some Lessons From the Free Speech Cases

The legitimization of the judicial system through the concept of
breadth and narrowness occurs in many contexts. This does not suggest that judicial use of breadth and narrowness always seeks to
dampen or avoid potential public controversy over a court's results.
Sometimes, a court clearly intends its use of narrowness and breadth
to bear much of the weight of a controversial decision. McCulloch v.

67. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should

be Overruled,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 428 (1992); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg,

Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1199-1200 (1992)
(discussing issues of principle, prudence, and strategy regarding the breadth of

Roe).
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Marylandi represents perhaps the best known example of this kind
of case. In McCulloch, the Court used narrowness and breadth not to
disguise or oversimplify a controversy, but to articulate it
forthrightly.69 The Court opted for a broad meaning of "necessary"
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, but conceded the existence of
narrower, stricter, more literal meanings of the term. 0 The choice of
the former meaning embodies value judgments, but here, the Court
was not pretending that mere description replaces normative judgment.
More commonly, though, judicial use of breadth and narrowness
serves a system-legitimizing function. Frequently, the supposedly
neutral descriptions of relative narrowness and breadth mask both
complexity and potential controversiality.
Consider some of the most important uses of narrowness and
breadth in the law. To begin, narrowness and breadth are embodied
in some important rules of constitutional law. For example, a restriction of speech may violate the First Amendment unless a court
holds the restriction to be sufficiently narrowly tailored.7 Similarly, a
government policy affecting racial groups differently may deny the
equal protection of the laws unless it is held sufficiently narrowly
tailored.'
As a spatial metaphor, narrowness and breadth in the free
speech area, as in other areas, lead to the supposition that the crucial
legal inquiry consists primarily of observing empirical fact or measurement. 73 Determining that one rule is more narrowly tailored than
another thus seems largely a matter of the relative "size" of the rules,
or of the number of cases they affect. Narrowness, whether absolute
or relative, is therefore characterized as descriptive and not primarily
normative.7 ' In this sense, the narrow tailoring inquiry should not entangle a court in evaluations.
68. 14 U.S. (1Wheat) 316 (1819).
69. See id.
70. See id at 413-15.
71. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510-12 (1996);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992); Board of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1989); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible
Tailoringand TranscendingStrictScrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417,2424 (1996).
72. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506-11 (1989) (plurality opinion); Texas
v. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932, 955 n.50 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring,43 UCLA L. REv. 1781 (1996).

73. See Volokh, supra note 71, at 2424.
74. See id
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In reality, though, the narrowness metaphor merely disguises
that a court is often making crucial and almost unconstrained normative choices when it decides whether a given restriction on speech is
narrowly tailored. It is one thing to say that a literal six-inch strip of
ground is narrower than a ten-inch strip. It is an entirely different
thing to say that one speech restriction is narrower than another.
For example, consider the principle that a restriction on commercial speech must be at least reasonably narrowly tailored to serve
the governmental interest that the restriction promotes.' This principle aims to avoid too great a mismatch between the scope of the restriction and the government interest promoted by the restriction.
The restriction need not be perfectly tailored, in the sense of affecting all but only those cases in which the government interest is really
at stake. Some underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness of restriction can be tolerated. Indeed, the reviewing court undertakes a
loose, intuitive balancing process. The scope of the restriction on
commercial speech cannot be grossly excessive in light of the gov76
ernment interest; it must be "in proportion to the interest served.,
The point is not that this test may overprotect or underprotect
commercial speech. Rather, the point is that this test for narrow tailoring is both readily manipulable and inherently crucially normative.
It is far removed from comparing the width of two strips of land.
Consider some of the following possible narrow tailoring issues
that the uncontroversial-measurement-of-width model does not hint
at. Does the degree of importance of the government interest affect
the degree of narrow tailoring required? How so? Are overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness within the scope of the restriction
equally undesirable? How, precisely, should a court consider that not
all restrictions on a person's commercial speech are equally burdensome? Which is worse-a restriction that reduces an audience, or a
restriction that distorts a message to some degree? Which is worsea restriction that reduces an audience, or one that leaves the size of
the audience unchanged, but delivers a less affluent or less interested
audience? Which is worse-a restriction that worsens the size or
composition of an audience, or one that makes reaching the intended
audience more financially expensive?
Where do non-free speech and even non-constitutional values fit
into the narrow tailoring problem? How, for example, should courts
75. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
76. IL (quoting In re RM.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
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assess the tailoring of an alternative rule that does not directly impair
commercial speech but that in practice will likely drive a number of
commercial speakers out of business? Commercial speakers and
their shareholders typically conduct business to make a profit rather
than to maximize their free speech rights. What if a business can
maximize its profits by convincing a court to adopt a genuinely more
speech-burdensome, but less expensive, restriction? Some commercial speakers may have an incentive to portray their free speech interests falsely, particularly where profit maximization suggests such a
course. Should a court consider the effect of these incentives? Is the
power to restrict a corporation's speech "narrower" than, and thus
included within, the power to abolish that corporation entirely? 77
Narrow tailoring inquiries typically consider real or hypothetical
alternatives to the regulation in question. Who should bear the burden of proving the availability of supposedly more narrowly tailored
regulations? Should courts be satisfied with merely hypothetical alternative regulatory schemes? When and how should a court conclude that a supposedly narrower regulation would be unworkable in
practice, or even too costly, and hence may be ignored? 7 Should a
court guess whether an apparently more narrowly tailored restriction
could muster enough political support to be enacted and then effectively enforced in practice? Will a commercial speaker always admit
whether it, or some other group, has the political clout to kill the
77. In 44 Liquormart,the plurality repudiated the idea that the government's
power to restrict commercial speech is "narrower" than and indeed included
within or logically inferable from the government's assumed police power to
simply close down the commercial enterprise at issue on appropriate grounds.
See 116 S. Ct. at 1512. But cf Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.,
478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (assuming the contrary). The 44 Liquormartplurality
was doubtless right to do so, but this repudiation itself shows that relations of
narrower and broader cannot simply be uncontroversially read off legal or social
reality. Relations of "lesser inclusion" also occur in the "unconstitutional conditions" case law. See UnconstitutionalConditions Symposium, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 175 (1989). For a further example of what appears to be a questionable
"broader includes the lesser" argument, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,

177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that congressional power to create

and abolish an executive office implies congressional power to reserve a role in
the removal of such officer). What counts as truly "lesser included" in a supposedly "broader" category is often of general interest. See sources cited supra note

58.

78. The Court in 44 Liquormartmay have held the speech restriction insufficiently narrowly tailored based in part on a "narrower" and less burdensome alternative-a public education campaign on excessive drinking-that it implicitly

recognized might not be effective in practice. See 44 Liquormart,116 S. Ct. at
1510.
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court's hypothetical, more narrowly tailored regulation? There is
certainly no guarantee that if a government enacts one restriction on
commercial speech, it will also be able to enact any and all more narrowly tailored restrictions.
How should courts deal with the possibility that an alternative
restriction may be more narrowly tailored and less burdensome to
the present plaintiff, but far less narrowly tailored and more burdensome to a number of other commercial speakers not before the
court? More generally, how should courts trade off the number of
commercial speakers and audience members burdened by a restriction and, with regard to both speaker and audience, the degree or severity of the burden? Certainly one restriction may burden fewer
persons but may burden those few more severely than the alternative
restriction. Is the degree of concentration or spreading of the burden
relevant to narrow tailoring?
For the sake of simplicity, assume that the government has only
one interest that its commercial speech restriction promotes. Perhaps
even a complex function of goals, traded off at different rates under
different circumstances, can be viewed as one single government interest. What should courts do about the obvious possibility that different restrictions on commercial speech may promote the assumed
government interest to different degrees? For example, what should
a court do if persuaded that a somewhat more tailored alternative
will promote the government's interest ninety percent as well as the
challenged restriction? What about eighty percent--does that still
promote the "same" government interest? Should the courts consider not just efficiency in this sense, but also differences in financial
cost for the government? What if a more narrowly tailored alternative would likely not promote the specified government interest terribly well but would promote effectively a government interest similar to, or arguably more important than, the interest promoted by the
challenged regulation?
Can, or should, courts resist the temptation to just try, in some
mysterious fashion, to weigh all the interests of all affected persons
and trade them off against one another? One voice, arguably that of
common sense, advocates balancing the degree to which two possible
regulations burden commercial speech, in the aggregate, against the
degree to which they promote something like the cited government
interest. Restrictions on commercial speech differ in their burden,
and state interests differ in their degree of importance. Should a
court sacrifice the degree of tailoring, or severity of the burden, if
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necessary, to promote an especially important and otherwise unattainable state interest? Should the courts trade the degree of narrow
tailoring required for the degree to which a given state interest is
promoted?
These narrow tailoring issues in the context of commercial
speech regulation could be multiplied. The point, however, is clear
enough: the model of uncontroversially observing whether one strip
of ground is narrower than another is of little use in coping with narrowness inquiries in the commercial speech context. The uncontroversial-measurement-of-width model does, however, help disguise
courts' enormous, nearly unconstrained discretion in this area. Use
of the model helps suppress controversy through the pretense of judicial reliance on observation and essentially neutral description,
rather than value judgments at every point in the analysis.
This point is not restricted to commercial speech cases. Consider
a yard sign regulation case, in which the government is considering
two possible rules.79 The first rule limits the property owner to displaying only two signs, but the signs may be large, close to the street,
and permanent. The second rule allows the property owner to display any number of signs, but the signs must be small, far from the
street, and only temporary.'o Through uncontroversial observation or
otherwise, is the second rule more narrowly tailored, or even much
more narrowly tailored, than the first? If so, is this not a matter of a
complex evaluation that could easily conclude otherwise, rather than
just a simple measurement?
Even the simplest and apparently clearest analogies to other
forms of narrowness can be misleading. The set of letters A through
E is mathematically narrower than the set of letters A through J.
This can be shown through uncontroversial, one-to-one matching of
the corresponding elements of the two sets, with some elements of
only the latter set going unmatched. The first set is a proper subset
of, and therefore narrower than, the second. But what does this
really say about apparently similar legal cases?
Imagine two alternative anti-discrimination ordinances. The
first prohibits discrimination or hate speech on the grounds of race
and sex. The second prohibits discrimination or hate speech on the
79. This hypothetical is based on Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, Virginia, 983 F.2d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1993). See also Cleveland
Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring
to Arlington County, 983 F.2d at 594).

80. See Arlington County, 983 F.2d at 593.
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grounds of race, sex, and veteran status but otherwise mirrors the
first. Is the first alternative clearly and unequivocally narrower than
the second? If the answer is yes, it is largely because the analogy of
matching elements of the two sets is misleading.
One problem with the element-matching analogy involves the
tensions among enforcement priorities. Suppose that the resources
available for enforcement are limited. In practice, is barring discrimination or hate speech on the grounds of race and sex merely a
proper subset of, and hence narrower than, barring discrimination or
hate speech on the grounds of race, sex, and veteran status? What if
adding protected categories dilutes-assuming it does not perhaps
enhance-enforcement of the prior categories? If it does, then it can
hardly be said that the protection of the prior categories remains intact.
Less obviously, adding protected categories in the hate speech
context changes, in subtle ways, the overall governmental policy conveyed. The extent to which protected categories are added to hate
speech legislation may suggest a broad message of universal equality
of respect among persons. As a policy of universality of respect and
tolerance is approached, the policy, generally and with respect to
each particular protected group, may gain coherence, power, and
conviction. On the other hand, not all potential targets of hate
speech are in all respects similarly situated. Some groups may genuinely require distinctive recognition and special consideration because of their history or current circumstances. Such groups may pay
a price when hate speech legislation falsely treats their situation the
same as any number of other groups.
It is difficult to argue that all groups that have ever suffered historical stigma have done so equally, or that their current vulnerabilities are precisely the same. It is true, for example, that both Irish
Americans and African Americans have at one time been subject to
some degree of ethnic-based invective, hate speech, and employment
discrimination." Both groups might cross some minimum historical
81. For reference to employment signs reading "No Irish Need Apply," once
common in the eastern United States, see Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO

L. REv. 1,4 (1995); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and

CulturalIdentity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 323 (1986); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and

the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv., 571, 577 (1995); Mitchell Kurfis, Note, The Constitutionality of
California'sProposition187: An Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 32 CAL. W. L. REv.

129, 151 (1995).
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baseline. Their present circumstances, however, obviously differ
quite significantly.
It may well be that to add protection for Irish Americans to protection for African Americans is not merely to add such protection;
adding such protection may diminish the protection available to African Americans and change or dilute the message and focus of the
protecting statute. The broader a protected class becomes by adding
marginally deserving claimants such as current Irish Americans, the
greater the eventual public temptation to reduce the depth or degree
of legal protection. If the underlying analogy to sets of letters were
to hold, it would be as though adding the letter "e" to a set of letters
changed the nature or status of the set itself, or of its prior members.
In such a case, the initial set of letters could not properly be considered merely a narrower set, or a proper subset, of the set now including the letter "e."
This is not a merely hypothetical point. It goes to the heart of
the Supreme Court's reasoning in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.' The
R.A.V. majority explicitly concluded, without argument, that a
broader hate speech ordinance "would have [had] precisely the same
beneficial effect ' ' n on St. Paul's compelling interests. But this need
not be so. Adding new protected classes may, on balance, either help
or hurt those already protected. Adding protected classes may
heighten the city's moral seriousness, logical consistency, and overall
sense of purposeful conviction. On the other hand, adding protected
classes may increase competition for attention and enforcement and
may encourage us falsely to equate different group experiences and
circumstances. Either way, the alternative ordinances cannot be described as simply narrower or broader but otherwise the same in their
effects.'
82. 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
487 (1993) (discussing R.A. V.).
83. R.A.V.,505U.S. at396.
84. The courts have occasionally shown interest in exploring some of the
complexities of narrowness and breadth in the area of free speech. Chief Justice
Phillips of the Texas Supreme Court, for example, has observed that
[fin the free expression context,... a constitutional provision may be
broad' or 'narrow' on at least six axes, including: 1) the types of ex-

pression deemed protected, 2) the range of potential infringers against

which the provision is operable, 3) the range of potential persons and
entities who may invoke the protection, 4) the type of permissible restrictions and sanctions on free expression, 5) the degree of importance
necessary for a competing interest or right to restrict free expression,
and 6) how narrowly the infringement on free expression must be tailored to accommodate that competing interest or right.
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B. Some Lessons from Equal Protectionand
the Law of Discrimination
Equal protection cases provide some of the most interesting
problems of narrowness and breadth, beginning with the real nar-

rowness or breadth of any category protected against discrimination.
Any statutorily or constitutionally protected category, such as race,
sex, age, or national origin, will inevitably overlap or correlate,
loosely or tightly, with other categories perhaps less legally protected.
Thus, race may correlate to one degree or another with complexion;
sex to height or realistic susceptibility to pregnancy; pregnancy itself
to the need for extended leave; ethnicity to noncitizenship, accent, or
preferred conversational language; and age to seniority, projected
retirement, or accumulated benefits. The more protected statuses
may be associated with, yet not identical to, the perhaps less protected statuses.
If the courts narrow the scope of protection to precisely the pro-

tected category, as opposed to all its distinguishable correlates, they
open the door to evasion of the statutory or constitutional protection.
Employers so disposed will notice which of the correlate grounds on
which they wish to discriminate are not protected. Of course, this requires some subtlety and discretion on the part of the employer.
Some correlates of protected categories will have no obvious workrelated significance. Thus, a university faculty seeking to limit the
hiring of women cannot plausibly introduce a height requirement.
But not all such attempts will be so transparent.
The Supreme Court has, for example, ruled that age discrimination
Ex parteTucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 16 (Tex. 1993) (Phillips, J., concurring).
This typology illustrates the gross inadequacy of any measurement-based understanding of narrowness and breadth in free speech law. 'The sheer indeterminacy
of how many "types" the protected expression falls into provides the starting
point. Then one can ask which is more important, the number of types of expression protected or the sheer number of speakers or listeners protected. By
the time the narrow tailoring issue is reached, it becomes apparent that the
"breadth" or burdensomeness of a restriction is surely a function of its severity
or overall qualitative impact as much as anything else. Finally, it is possible that
beyond some point, "broadening" the protection of free speech may lead courts
to reduce the "depth" or strength of free speech protection. The more behaviors
counted as speech, or, for example, the wider the range of behaviors classified as
religious, the greater the eventual pressure to accord less absolute, preemptive
weight to free speech or free exercise of religion. After all, the more loosely one
defines the scope of speech or religion, the less important or worthy the incremental cases of speech or religion are likely to be. This may provoke the question of why the public welfare should be sacrificed merely for such a marginal,
attenuated instance of speech or religion.
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means discrimination on the basis of age, and not any other correlated consideration.' But age discrimination in employment often is
not a matter of some deep emotional bias against or stereotyping of
the relatively old in the work force. Often, an employer is tempted to
notice that age may correlate with seniority, and seniority with size of
total compensation package. An employer who has now decided that
years of employee loyalty or job experience are not as valuable as he
once thought can fire his more expensive, if commonly older, workers
without discriminating on the basis of age.'
To protect only age, in this context, is not to protect age effectively. A statute prohibiting age discrimination in the workplace
might well have been intended to reduce fears that accepting the
benefits of an employer's gratitude over a period of years may eventually enhance the chances of layoff or dismissal at a vulnerable career point.'
The narrowness or breadth of protected classes under the equal
protection clause is subject to endless judicial manipulation. Similarly manipulable is the crucial concept of narrow tailoring in equal
protection cases. If narrowness of tailoring were merely a matter of
uncontroversial counting, observing, and measuring, the potential for
judicial manipulation would be reduced. Instead, the idea of narrow
85. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) ("[T]here is no
disparate treatment under the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] when
the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the employee's
age."). Of course, employer decisions regarding pension benefits availability
may, even if they do not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), nevertheless violate the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). See id. at 612.
86. See id at 609.
87. For a sampling of other contexts in which parallel issues arise, see, for example, Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (barring noncitizen employees does not inevitably imply national origin discrimination);
Fisherv. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1448 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[A] policy may discriminate between those employees who take off
long periods of time in order to raise children and those who either do
not have children or are able to raise them without an appreciable career interruption. That is not inherently sex specific and does not give
rise to a claim under Title VII.");
Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737-39 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that termination based on employer's fear that employee would not return to work after maternity leave, by itself, was not within the scope of the prohibition of pregnancy discrimination, because the employer might have a broader
policy of terminating any employee about to embark on any extended leave);
Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983)
(distinguishing not hiring pregnant women from not hiring anyone needing a
leave of absence soon after hire).
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tailoring typically permits the court to reach any preferred result
while pretending to engage in some process like careful measuring.
To the extent that anyone credits, even subconsciously, the metaphor
of measuring, the legal system is to that extent able to purchase
legitimacy.
Courts often seek, whether under self-delusion or not, to depict
the narrow tailoring determination as a matter of inquiry or of
"finding out." The recurring "precision of fit" metaphor depicts the
Court trying to match a piece of a jigsaw puzzle against an allegedly
corresponding empty outline. For example, in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,' the majority employed strict scrutiny, and hence narrow tailoring, as the appropriate equal protection standard in federal
race discrimination cases. 9 The Court embraced the pretense of
precision by requiring "the most exact connection between justification and classification," 9 as though it were examining a carpentry
joint under a magnifying glass. Narrow tailoring, for example, might
require that a program "'not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate."' 9 This creates an image of watching
for certain effects, waiting for them to disappear, and then almost simultaneously terminating the remedy for those effects because the
remedy is no longer needed. In this situation, the existence of discrimination or a discriminatory effect remains a question that requires evaluation and judgment.
Of course, the courts92 and commentators9 recognize that the
narrow tailoring inquiry cannot entirely avoid judgments on normative matters. But whether from inattention or by design, courts typically understate the normative elements and the sheer manipulability
of the narrow tailoring inquiry.
Perhaps the most widely recognized example of this lies in Justice Powell's assumption in Regents of the University of Californiav.
Bakke 4 that Harvard's attachment of unspecified weight to racial
88. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).

89. See id. at 2117.
90. Id (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,537 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)).
91. 1& at 2118 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
92. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 310 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing equal protection narrow
tailoring as involving "the smallest possible deviation from established norms").
93. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 59, at 1791 (1996) (stating that affirmative action narrow tailoring involves "less of a burden on constitutional norms concerning racial divisiveness").
94. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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considerations with respect to every admissions decision was more
narrowly tailored than U.C. Davis's policy of setting aside a specific
number of places for qualified minorities while entirely ignoring race
elsewhere. 5 This conclusion is too quick. Without knowing the
weight of the racial considerations, or the number of set aside openings involved, how does one tell in the abstract that one system burdens anyone's interests more than the other? Consider an analogous
problem. Are a decathlon entrant's overall chances always better
when wearing some unspecified measure of ankle weights for all ten
events than when automatically disqualified from competing in one
or two events but otherwise unencumbered?
Presumably, Justice Powell did not believe that the Harvard
model necessarily maximized the White applicants' chances for admission under an effective affirmative action plan. More likely, he
considered the Harvard unspecified-but-uniform-weight approach to
affirmative action more narrowly tailored simply because it seemed
more refined, more discreet, more subtle, and more genteel." However, this alone fails to resolve the narrow tailoring issue. Denying
that discreetness is an element of narrow tailoring is not necessary to
deny that discreetness is the very soul of narrow tailoring, especially
if the most discreet approach may reduce white acceptance rates below that necessary to achieve affirmative action aims.
Justice Powell's most significant error is not overemphasizing the
constitutional status of being discreet. Rather, it lies in his failure to
acknowledge the multiple paths of the narrow tailoring inquiry and
the inherent manipulability of its outcome. In a recent Title VII affirmative action case, Taxman v. Board of Education,9 Chief Judge
Sloviter's dissent agreed with the majority that narrow tailoring requires something like not unnecessarily burdening the interests of
non-minorities," or "minimizing any adverse effect [the quota system
has] on non-minorities." 99 Interestingly, Chief Judge Sloviter tacitly
recognized that the school board's failure to specify a particular numerical goal in seeking workforce diversity could, as a given judge
may be inclined, be counted either for or against the narrow tailoring
95. See id. at 316-21.
96. See Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F Powell and the Jurisprudenceof Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1875 (1995) (citing JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR.,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 469-73, 484 (1994)).
97. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert granted,117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).
98. See id at 1564.
99. Ld. at 1575 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
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of the school board's plan.13
For example, suppose a court resents affirmative action and
wishes to strike down affirmative action plans for lack of narrow
tailoring. What can such a court do with the presence, or the absence, of a specified numerical goal? A court can use both the presence and the absence of any such goal to find the lack of narrow tailoring. The presence of a numerical goal suggests rigidity. Perhaps a
specified number suggests a quota or a quasi-quota. Any number can
be portrayed as arbitrarily selected and therefore not narrowly tailored. Whatever the number, a different baseline, a different goal, a
different geographical area, and a different underlying population or
applicant pool could easily have been selected. All this suggests rigidity and arbitrariness.
Alternatively, if the plan fails to specify a numerical goal, an unsympathetic court can strike down the affirmative action program on
similar grounds. The absence of a specified numerical goal suggests
arbitrariness, subjectivity, open-endedness in scope and duration, unbounded discretion, and lack of definition. Of course, this example
shows not the arbitrariness of the program itself, but rather the availability of the narrow tailoring inquiry to condemn any affirmative action program on equal, opposite, and contradictory grounds.
The argument may be taken a step further. The recent Hopwood v. Texas '°' case illustrates how a court can declare any particular affirmative action numerical goal either too high or too low to be
considered narrowly tailored to the governmental interest in remedying past state discrimination. The fact that the law school's admissions goal for Mexican Americans was twice that for African Americans troubled the Hopwood court, given that the court had found a
documented history of state discrimination against the latter, but not
against the former."'2 How, then, could it be said that the Texas program was narrowly tailored to remedy past state discrimination?1°3
If a court is so inclined, this presents an unwinnable shell game.
If the remedial goal for African Americans is set above any given
100. See id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Sloviter took the absence
of any specified numerical target as evidence of the plan's lack of rigidity. See id.
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
101. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
102. See id. at 955 n.50.
103. See id. In contrast, a court disposed toward affirmative action could find
virtually any actually enacted program to be narrowly tailored as promoting
some simple or complex function of partially conflicting long term government
interests. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
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point, it becomes easier for a court to point to any disparity in paper
credentials between the marginal African American admittee and the
marginal rejected White or Mexican American, and find disproportion, severity of impact, and lack of narrow tailoring. On the other
hand, if the remedial goal for African Americans is set below any
given point, the court can still find lack of narrow tailoring. The
lower figure indicates a different kind of disproportion. The small
number of African American admittees compared to Mexican
American and White admittees indicates the state's lack of seriousness with respect to its purported remedial goals. Suppose the state
at this point suggests that historic discrimination, at every level and in
various forms, has artificially suppressed the percentages of African
Americans with the required paper academic credentials and career
goals. The court may then simply readdress the question of whether
the numerical goals for African Americans are too high under the unfortunate historical circumstances, and thus not narrowly tailored.
Affirmative action programs based on the minority-role-model
theory are vulnerable to a similar fate. A court seeking to reject the
programs can simply count the role models and find a lack of narrow
tailoring. The court may deem one or a few minority role models insufficient to have a demonstrable impact; their presence is thus not
narrowly tailored to promote the purposes envisioned by role model
theory. However, as the number of minority role models increases,
the lack of narrow tailoring may inhere in the apparent openendedness or unlimitedness of the program in scope and over time. 4
Why is not even one relevant role model sufficient?
By re-characterizing and selectively ignoring or emphasizing the
interests and burdens to be weighed, affirmative action programs can
be upheld or condemned on narrow tailoring grounds that appear
neutral, essentially descriptive, or measurement-based. The judicial
system purchases legitimacy to the degree that anyone supposes, because of the narrow tailoring metaphor, that the legal judgment really
reflects an empirical measuring process, as opposed to whatever
normative predispositions and interests the court may harbor.
C. Ashwander Narrowness
Narrowness is the focus of Justice Louis Brandeis' renowned
contribution to judicial theory in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley

104. See Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919-20.
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Authority."°5 Generally, Brandeis states that a court should avoid

constitutional decisions where possible by deciding the case on narrower, nonconstitutional grounds. If a decision on constitutional
grounds is unavoidable, the decision should be made on the
narrowest constitutional grounds available. °6 In particular, Justice
Brandeis urged that a court "not 'formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader
1 7 than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
,,,
70

applied.

While one could respond to Justice Brandeis' principles in any
number of ways,"" it suffices to state for the purposes of this discussion that narrowness is not as unequivocal as the Brandeis formulae
suggest. In some sense, a case decided on the basis of an interpretation of an administrative regulation is narrower than deciding the
case on statutory grounds. Similarly, a decision on statutory interpretation grounds is narrower than a decision on a constitutional issue.
But there is more to narrowness than this presumed coherent hierarchy of levels of the law-a hierarchy that upon closer examination
makes less logical sense than we typically imagine."
Again, narrowness in this context is not merely a matter of presumed levels in a legal hierarchy. Instead, there is also a sense of
narrowness that avoids delicate, divisive, or important issues and that
avoids intrusive decisions on controversial grounds. For example,
Justice Frankfurter indicated that under, the Ashwander principle,
"clashes between different branches of the government should be
avoided if a legal ground of less explosive potentialities is properly
available. Constitutional adjudications are apt by exposing differences to exacerbate them." 0
105. 297 U.S. 288,341-49 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
106. See id.; Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Cr. REv. 71,
72 (1995).
107. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
108. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, 35 B.C. L.

REV. 1003 (1994); Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How

Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separationof Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REv.
85, 94-111 (1995); Schauer, supranote 106. Particularly relevant is Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious ConstitutionalDoubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 5, 7
(1996) (noting the manipulability of the constitutional avoidability doctrine in
free speech cases).
109. For some doubts about the hierarchalism of levels of the law, see R.
George Wright, Two Models of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 40 AM. U. L. REV.

1357 (1990).

110. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Nonetheless, the difference between narrower as hierarchically
lower and narrower as less controversial or less divisive often passes
unnoticed, as a constitutional ruling will typically raise more hackles
than a decision on nonconstitutional grounds. Too, there may often
exist a fairly good consensus as to whether one possible constitutional
ruling is somehow narrower than another constitutional ruling"'-but
not always. Narrowness in the Ashwander sense cannot simply be
read off of the circumstances of a problem of judicial choice.
For example, which is narrower: deciding a case on the constitutional grounds of mootness or on the basis of a statutory interpretation that will either broadly vitalize or undercut a sweeping, hardwon civil rights statute? Are some cases decided on the grounds of
lack of constitutional standing less controversial, and others more
controversial, than a decision on the statutory merits? Statutes may
be easy or difficult to revise legislatively, just as constitutional mootness and standing problems may be easy, or quite difficult, to overcome. Deciding a case by finally disposing of a moribund, long obsolete, outlying constitutional doctrine may actually be relatively
narrow. But such a decision requires a judgment, perhaps in itself
controversial, that the constitutional doctrine to be pruned really is
moribund. What is moribund to one judge may be unappreciated but
sound and enduring to another.
Consider an increasingly important type of problem in which the
court must decide whether one constitutional approach is narrower
or less intrusive than another. Suppose a court wishes to strike down
a state law that is thought to be justified by direct reference to a traditional moral precept. Assume, plausibly, that nonconstitutional
means of doing so are unavailable. The court presumably wishes,
under Ashwander, to rely on the narrowest constitutional grounds.
In such cases two obvious possibilities will exist under the equal protection clause. The court may strike down the state law under either
minimum scrutiny" or under strict scrutiny.' But typically, a good
case can be made that either approach is narrower than the other.
Striking down the restriction on minimum scrutiny grounds
111. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110

HARV. L. REv. 4, 15 (1996) (applying minimum scrutiny to restrictions burden-

ing the mentally retarded as narrower than applying minimum scrutiny to all
nonracial categories).
112. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 14.3, at 601 n.5 (5th ed. 1995) (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S.

1 (1988)).
113. See, e.g., id., at 601-04 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
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could well involve a judicial pronouncement that the state law serves
no purpose at all, or that the law serves only shameful, invidious, irrational, or illegitimate purposes." The most obvious alternative, the

use of strict scrutiny, would involve a judicial determination that the
classification at stake is of special constitutional significance, such
that the state must show both an overridingly important public interest and that no less restrictive state law could similarly promote that
interest.""
Which of these approaches is narrower or less intrusive, however, reduces largely to contestable judgments in particular circumstances. Ordinarily, recognizing a new fundamental right or a new
suspect classification would represent the very opposite of narrowness. But is it narrower or less intrusive for the courts to tell the
states, however correctly, that only embarrassing purposes underlie a
range of state statutes? Which approach is "really" narrower?
D. The Supposed Narrowest Grounds in PluralOpinion Cases

Courts are often called upon to take account of prior appellate
cases in which no single holding attracted a majority of the judges. In
such cases, must the later court give no special weight at all to the
earlier case on the grounds that no majority agreed on any common
rationale? The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve this problem
in, among other cases, Marks v. United States."6 The Court in Marks

determined that "when a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."'.
Unfortunately, it will often not be clear what "narrowest" means
in this context, and this ambiguity opens the door to judicial arbitrariness and manipulation. In locating the narrowest rationale, one
must seek something like the most fact-specific, the least controversial, the least ambitious, the least sweeping, or the least general
rule;"' a "least common denominator;"" 9 or an opinion most likely to
114.
115.
116.
117.

See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 637-38.
430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977).
Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)

(plurality opinion)).

118. See Linda Novak, Note, The PrecedentialValue of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756,763-64 (1990); Mark Alan Thurmon, Note,
When the Court Divides: Reconsideringthe PrecedentialValue of Supreme Court
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attract future majority support." But these inquiries are not all the
same. They may produce different outcomes. Can it really be said
that the most fact-specific opinion is invariably the opinion that a future majority will most likely embrace? Further, none of these criteria is by itself particularly clear and unequivocal.
Suppose one wants to decide how fact-specific an opinion is. Is
fact-specificity a matter of the number of plaintiffs affected? The
number of defendants affected? Does this number include actual
plaintiffs and defendants, or the total number of persons potentially
affected? Over what time frame? What if a rule affects fewer people, or fewer cases, but also affects persons in more important ways?
Severity of impact should matter-after all, fact-specificity is thought
to be partly a matter of relative uncontroversiality"' And why
should narrowness not also reflect the number of statutes or rules affected?2 But then, what if an opinion upholds, or strikes down, only
a few rules, but those rules were either popular or especially important? This leaves the question: which is narrower, striking down five
moribund, trivial rules on statutory grounds or striking down three
vital, broad rules on constitutional grounds?
The assumption seems to be that, at least in some cases, the
various judicial opinions will nest logically. In such cases, presumably
logic will compel a judge who naturally endorses an extreme or
broadly sweeping opinion to adopt a milder, narrower, less ambitious
holding.1 2 Surely, a judge who believes that a certain quantity is less
than half a dozen is implicitly committed to the view that the same
quantity is less than two dozen.
But how far can this "logical nesting" model really be applied?
Suppose a bloc of centrist judges endorses a holding that a defendant
should not be convicted of possessing obscene materials if the Oracle
at Delphi advises against conviction. In the immediate case, the
Oracle has so advised, and the centrist bloc has joined a bloc of First
Amendment near absolutists to form a majority for overturning the
defendant's conviction. Can oracle consultation then be taken as the
PluralityDecisions,42 DUKE L.J. 419, 420-21 (1992).
119. See Thurmon, supranote 118, at 428.
120. See id. at 435.
121. See id at 420-21.
122. See id.
123. See Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model Forthe Interpretationof Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1603 (1992) (On the "narrowest

grounds" model, "[t]he Justices supporting the broader legal rule must necessar-

ily recognize the validity of the narrower legal rule."). The author then critiques

this model. See id. at 1603-04.
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holding of the case? Are the First Amendment near absolutists implicitly committed to it as a narrower- or lesser-included inference
from their own broader, more extreme approach? 24
Not really. A First Amendment near absolutist could quite consistently prefer convicting some defendants to adopting a rule that
frees them but only because the Oracle commands it so. A First
Amendment near absolutist might find all obscenity convictions degrading, but find even more degrading an acquittal based on abandoning the familiar rule of law in favor of reliance on the Oracle. Or
imagine, however implausibly, that a centrist bloc were willing to acquit obscenity defendants on the basis of race. Would it be logical to
inflate the legal status of such a view artificially by adding in the
votes of First Amendment near absolutists?
Thus far, this discussion has ignored the common requirement
that the search for narrowest grounds consider only the opinions of
those judges concurring in the judgment.l2 Of course, dissenters
typically do not provide a binding rule of law. But in some cases, it
would be a mistake to ignore the logic of dissenting opinions in predicting what the court will do in future cases. Suppose a dissenting
justice closely tracked the plurality opinion's reasoning but dissented
on narrow, unrepeatable, merely procedural, or sheerly idiosyncratic
grounds. Realistically, a plurality and a bloc of entirely sympathetic
judges who, for instance, dissented solely because the appellant failed
to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial or missed the statute of
limitations, may comprise the majority.
A deeper complication lies in the reality that sometimes broad
rules are more genuinely convincing than related narrower rules by
themselves. For example, a reasonable judge could believe in the
equal treatment of all persons, while finding no really convincing narrower way to approach the question of whether some particular
group of persons, on its own distinctive merits, deserves equal

124. Compare King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)
("Because Justices Black and Douglas had to agree, as a logical consequence of
their own position, with the plurality's view that anything with redeeming social
value is not obscene, the plurality of three in effect spoke for five Justices .... ")
with Thurmon, supra note 118, at 432, 433 ("Justices Black and Douglas [] would
never have accepted the plurality's three-part obscenity test, or any other obscenity test for that matter"). The King court itself recognized that not all loosely
narrower grounds are proper subsets of all broader grounds. See King, 950 F.2d
at 781-82.
125. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d
129, 133-34 (6th Cir. 1994).
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treatment. Under such a view, there would be no genuinely convincing narrow, independent, and fact-specific reasons why Latvians
should receive equal treatment; the broad theory of human equality
does all the real work.' 6 This complication, though, is in a sense too
broad. Its real import calls into question the judicial desire to search
for the narrowest grounds of a result.
E. Narrownessand Overbreadth
Concerned that unduly broad restrictions may discourage legitimate, constitutionally protected speech along with constitutionally
prohibitable speech, courts have developed the doctrine of overbreadth.m Defendants whose speech or symbolic conduct could have
been prohibited by a narrower, constitutionally permissible restriction may be allowed to challenge a speech restriction as overbroad
for the sake of other, more constitutionally deserving speakers." In
light of the countervailing government interests, though, the courts
will invoke the overbreadth doctrine in favor of the defendant
speaker only where the speech restriction's overbreadth is substantial.' 29 The substantiality of the overbreadth must be "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. '
Whether a speech restriction is substantially overbroad thus relates to the breadth of its proper and legitimate application. Unfortunately, courts again emphasize measurement, number, and quantity
in deciding whether the overbreadth is substantial. Courts ask
whether legitimate speech will be "repeatedly"'3 chilled, whether
"many individuals" 32 will be affected, and consider the "number of
instances"'3' of protected activity-if not the number of speakers or

126. Professor Cass Sunstein has argued for narrow or minimalist reasoning in
contradictory to argue the broad claim that one is never better off endorsing
broad claims. See Sunstein, supra note 111, at 15-20.
127. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,521 (1972).
128. See id. at 521; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,768-69 (1982).
129. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); Ferber,458 U.S. at
770-72.
130. Broadrick,413 U.S. at 615.
131. Ferber,458 U.S. at 772.
132 IL
many contexts by judges but without denying this point. Indeed, it would be self-

133. Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First

Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031, 1065 (1983); see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863
(1991).
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listeners-affected, along with whether "the majority of cases"' 34 that
a statute affects involve constitutionally prohibitable conduct, or
whether the overbroad
scope of the restriction amounts to only "a
135
tiny fraction.,
Despite the pretense of measurement, the overbreadth doctrine
invites important normative and potentially controversial judgments
at every turn. Two possible speech restrictions may affect the same
number of potential speakers without also affecting an equal number
of listeners, or an equal number of instances of either actual speech,
potential speech, or criminally prosecuted speech. One speaker-a
high volume pornographer, perhaps-may speak much more frequently than another speaker. Surely one would want to consider the
severity of the speech restriction on the affected parties or at least on
their speech. Does the variety of ideas affected matter? How does
one compare the severity of impact on a professional pornographer
with the impact on a political speaker caught up in an overbroad
statute? Can a court consider either the importance or the categori' of the speech affected
cal "value"136
or, alternatively, the presumed
social value of the restriction?
Some of these considerations surely are relevant to whether the
overbreadth of a speech restriction is substantial.' Yet these considerations will typically be evaluative and contestable. Though courts
may claim to measure overbreadth in fractions, they are in fact deciding overbreadth issues either carelessly or through potentially debatable value assessments. To pretend that the overbreadth doctrine
depends crucially on the use of a tape measure is to purchase judicial
legitimacy illicitly. If mystification" buys legitimacy by pretending
that adjudication is a complex process that only the initiated can
grasp, buying legitimacy by pretending that plain measuring is actually determining the judicial outcomes is the converse technique.
134. Redish, supra note 133, at 1064.
135. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 114 n.11 (1990).
136. For discussion of the idea of differences in categorical value of different
kinds of speech, see Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 547
(1989), Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv.
297 (1994), and Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw. U. L.
REv. 555 (1989).
137. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., supra note 133, at 894 ("[T]he question of
when overbreadth is intolerably substantial has an irreducible component of
policy.").
138. For some discussion of mystification and legal authority, see William
McBride, The Fetishism of Illegality and the Mystifications of "Authority" and
"Legitimacy," 18 GA. L. REv. 863, 875 (1984).
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F. Narrowness and Breadth in the DelegationDoctrine
The delegation doctrine requires that the legislative branch not
surrender its authority, however willingly, to the executive branch or
to private parties. 139 But because every statutory enactment confers
enforcement discretion, it might seem that the delegation doctrine
should rule out excessively broad delegations of legislative authority
while permitting narrower delegations. 1" Typically, modem courts
require only an "intelligible principle"'' derived from one or more of
any number of possible sources 42 to guide an administrative agency's
discretion.
Interestingly, in delegation doctrine cases, the courts and commentators do not typically claim that the literal narrowness or
breadth of the delegation is decisive. 43 Instead, the courts look more
fundamentality or importance," or to the
directly to the
"significance," 14' of the powers delegated. But this is curious. Why,
in the particular context of the delegation doctrine, do the courts
admit that measurements and counting neither explain nor justify
their results?
The main answer seems clear. The need to engage in the
"reverse mystification" of claiming that the courts are only uncontroversially measuring is greatest when the courts wish to exercise discretion in different directions as the cases appear to them. Courts in
general might want to preserve their option of finding a speech restriction or an affirmative action program narrowly tailored or not.
At the federal level, however, the courts have for decades shown little interest in resuscitating the delegation doctrine.'46 In the modern
139. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529
(1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
140. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F.
Supp. 737,744-46 (D.D.C. 1971).
141. Id. at 746 (quoting Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).

The intelligible principle requirement is discussed in Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 426 (1944) and in Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative

Power: 11, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 561,569 (1947).
142. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters,337 F.Supp. at 748.
143. See, e.g., id. at 745-46.
144. See

ALEXANDER

M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE

SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS

161 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986)

(1962); Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress,and Executive Policy-Making: Notes
on Three Doctrines,40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46, 62 (1976).

145. Gewirtz, supra note 144, at 66-67.
146. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW § 2.7, at 56 (3d ed.
1991). For a more mixed picture, see David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1233 (1985).
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regulatory state, broad delegation of authority strikes most federal
judges as desirable, if not necessary. The courts need not, therefore,
preserve their room to maneuver. The courts need only a test which
will ultimately permit delegation. An intelligible guiding principle
from one source or another' 47 -and a general supporting public belief
in the legitimacy of the modem administrative state which need not
be induced through the judiciary-would suffice.
G. Narrownessand Breadth and the Canons of
Statutory Interpretation
Narrowness and breadth seem to lie at the heart of typical formulations of many traditional and modem canons of statutory interpretation, as in the maxims that remedial statutes are to be interpreted broadly' or that criminal statutes are to be interpreted
narrowly. 49 Any number of such canons rely on ideas of narrowness
and breadth, and in fact such canons extend far beyond the interpretation of statutes.' It has been famously concluded that the actual
usefulness of the canons is limited, because on any given occasion a
judge may simply find no need for referring to the canons or may
147. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, § 2.8 at 57 (citing Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)).
148. See SINGER, supra note 43, § 58.04; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805

(1983).
149. See SINGER, supra note 43, § 58.04, at 79; Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345, 345; Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation,Precedentand the Common Law, 7 Ox. J. LEGAL STuD. 215, 256
(1987); Posner, supra note 148, at 805.
150. For example, insurance coverage provisions are construed broadly, while
insurance exclusions are construed narrowly. See Francis J. Mootz, Principlesof
Insurance Coverage: A Guide for the Employment Lawyer, 18 W. NEW ENG. L.

REv. 5, 27-28 (1996). For a compressed collection of many of the statutory canons, see Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.

L. REv. 405, 506-08 (1989).

151. In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court interpreted the scope of civil RICO
liability. The Court could presumably have drawn upon broadening canons, in
light of the statute's remedial purposes, quite apart from the express instructions
of Congress to do so. See 507 U.S. 170 (1993); see also Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904,
84 Stat. 947, 94748 (requiring that the statute "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes"). The Court could instead have deployed narrowing
canons, including those favoring individual freedom of action. See SINGER, supra
note 43, § 58.04. Either option would have been open, especially in light of the
ambiguities inherent in "an express narrow purpose implemented through expansive statutory language." William V. Dalferes Jr., Reves v. Ernst & Young:
A Blueprintto Limit Civil RICO's Reach, THE BRIEF, Winter 1995, at 10, 11. Instead, the Court chose neither option, concluding that no recourse to competing
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arbitrarily deploy one canon of a matched pair of mutually opposing
canons.'5 2 Moreover, any individual canon can be critiqued on its own
merits.1

Consider, for example, that most if not all criminal statutes appear as attempts to remedy a public harm. This would suggest the
possibility of interpreting a criminal statute broadly in some contexts.
Suppose there exists an old criminal statute that prohibits ordinary
persons from "laying hands upon" a woman.'- But the defendant has
instead attacked a woman with a weapon, either at a distance or directly. If no other redress is available, how should courts interpret
the statute? The impulse to construe the criminal statute narrowly'55
is in this case absent. Instead, a broad construction of the statute is
preferable to effectuate its obvious purposes. A narrow reading
would trivialize the statute.
However, the point is not that the canons mutually annihilate, or
that they are wrong on the merits, but that any reliance on the ideas
of narrowness and breadth allows the individual canons to fall into an
indeterminacy resolved typically by a court's undefended and even
unexpressed normative preferences. This remains obscure only because the concepts of narrowness and breadth often do no real work
when the canons formally referring to them are applied. For example, the canon construing a criminal statute narrowly in favor of the
defendant may not really depend on the idea of narrowness.'56 What
changes if the word "narrowly" is removed from the preceding sentence? In many criminal cases, the judge may simply mean to construe the statute in the defendant's favor. The idea of narrowness
may add nothing to the disposition to favor the defendant.
Suppose that an oral proclamation has criminalized the possession of small amounts of mercury but remained ambiguous about
whether the government meant to criminalize only holding rocks
canons was necessary in light of the clarity of the statute "from its language and
legislative history." Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 n.8. The clarity of the statute, and the
superfluousness of any recourse to the canons, was less apparent to Justices
Souter and White. See id at 187 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS app. C at 521-35 (1960); Posner, supra note 148, at 806.
153. See Posner, supra note 148, at 806.
154. This statute is loosely suggested by HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1170 (1958) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey

eds., 1994).

155. See id. at 492,1198.
156. See sources cited supranote 53 and accompanying text.
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from the innermost planet, or instead the chemical element mercury,
as commonly found in batteries and thermometers. The first criminal
prosecution turns out, remarkably enough, to involve someone
caught with soil samples from the planet Mercury. The judge then
construes the oral proclamation in the defendant's favor, ordering
that the prosecution be dismissed. But this may assume that the govenment intended one and only one of the two possible references to
mercury. One possible reference-to samples of the planet-strikes
us as narrow compared to the other possible reference, to the more
common chemical element. If the judge concludes that the latter reference was intended, the current defendant's interests have been
served but at the cost of tending to establish a broader, rather than a
narrower, scope of the prohibition at the expense of future defendants. Future defendants caught with batteries may in turn find a
sympathetic judge, but the judge of the first defendant has still opted
to assist only that particular defendant by choosing the broader interpretation of the prohibition.
At least in some cases, though, the ideas of narrowness and
breadth may perform some real work in applying canons of statutory
construction. Even the fanciful example above hints at this possibility. A court may wish less to protect the particular current criminal
defendant, than to establish a rule in interpreting an ambiguous statute that protects the greatest number of future defendants, given the
rule in the current case as a precedent. A rule that protects the current defendant may well conflict with a rule that protects the most
defendants over time. But can it be said that the narrowest rule will
protect the most defendants? Should a judge not also consider the
possibility that not all interpretations of a statute would inspire equal
enforcement? A rule barring Mercury soil samples may affect fewer
persons than a rule barring the element mercury, but the latter prohibition might well remain unenforced in practice. The two possible
rules may not be equally avoidable by ordinary citizens. Determinations of narrowness and breadth thus require contestable predictive
judgments and potentially dubious moral and other evaluative judgments as well. The idea of merely measuring narrowness and breadth
obscures all of these possible judgments.
H. A FinalWord on the Breadth of Case Holdings
Observers of the judicial system often worry about the proper
narrowness or breadth of case holdings. Commentators may urge,
for example, something like a rebuttable presumption in favor of
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avoiding broad case holdings.'" Such discussions can shed light on
the metaphor of narrowness and breadth. Just as natural space and
time can for some purposes be thought of as interwoven,' 58 so the
metaphorical spatial breadth or narrowness of a case holding can be
thought of as shifting judicial power into the future or towards the
present. ' 9

But given the nature of judicial culture, the narrowness and
breadth of case holdings should be expected largely to regulate itself.
This should reflect individual judicial self-interest and concerns for
judicial legitimacy. Consider, for example, that a narrow holding in a
case where the judge does not feel strongly requires the judge to pay
only a very limited price. A broader holding might minimally increase the judge's fame and influence, but to no crucial purpose. On
the other hand, a broad holding would increase the odds of an embarrassing reversal or of criticism of one's work.
Of course, the judicial culture will expect and encourage broad
holdings in some cases. Issues of what the judicial culture views as
fundamental human rights constitute one class of examples. Surely,
for example, the Court in Loving v. Virginia'6 could have struck
down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute on the narrower grounds
that it criminalized only racial intermarriages involving a Caucasian. ' But this narrow holding would itself have been a moral outrage. Crucial intuitions are really not so much at the narrow level of
whether a member of a specific racial group should be allowed to
marry a member of another specific racial group or at the level of
whether a particular anti-miscegenation statute affords one racial
group a relatively better deal than another. These issues seem at
most secondary. Crucial intuitions really dwell at a broader, more
157. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40
YALE L.J. 161, 178 (1930); Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the Size of
ConstitutionalDecisions, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 543, 555 (1996) ("[D]eciding cases according to broad rules necessarily involves deciding cases prematurely ......
Sunstein, supranote 111, at 4, 6.
158. See ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY 30-31 (Edwin
Plimpton Adams trans., 4th ed. 1953) (1922). More dramatically, there may be
exotic circumstances under which time assumes some attributes akin to those of
space. See C. J. Isham, Quantum Theories of the Creation of the Universe, in
QUANTUM COSMOLOGY AND THE LAWS OF NATURE: SCIENTIFIC PERSPECrIVES

ON DIVINE ACTION 49, 73 (Robert J. Russell et al.
HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 33 (1992).

159. See Schauer, supra note 157, at 555.
160. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
161. See id. at 11 (Stewart, J., concurring).

eds., 1993); see also STEPHEN
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general level, and a broader judicial holding is correspondingly appropriate.162
Some judges may be tempted to issue resoundingly broad visionary pronouncements in accordance with their own idiosyncratic
tastes. This may earn journalistic favor and attention. But the
broader the holding, the redder the flag. Even if the judge assumes,
perhaps mistakenly, that the broad precedent will not authorize what
that judge would find personally distasteful in unforeseeable future
circumstances,"' the judge considering a broad holding has other concerns. Too broad a holding may be perceived as an invitation to be
brought up short or criticized on appeal. And there is a real risk that
a future judge who disagrees with a broad holding may not preserve
the narrow, more defensible core of that prior holding, but may be
provoked by the prior opinion's breadth to disagree with it broadly,
or overrule it entirely.
Thus a judge who wishes simply to maximize his or her own personal influence on the law over time has incentives to write what will
be perceived as narrow holdings, except in the rare cases in which the
legal culture will be genuinely dissatisfied with a narrow holding.
And despite the workings of the judicial legitimization process, there
will also be a few cases in which a broad holding that is acceptable to
the judicial culture nonetheless strains credulity with much of the
broader public.'"

162- See id.at 12-13 (Stewart, J., concurring); cf Kloppenberg, supranote 108, at

55 (referring to some of the 1950s free speech cases, "[b]y 'tiptoeing' around speech
incursions with the avoidance canon rather than directly condemning them, the
Court impoverished us as a polity."). But cf James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of
Legal Dreams: A CommunitarianDefense of Judicial Restraint,71 N.C. L. REV.

805 (1993) (arguing generally for the inclusive, non-alienating effects in many cases
of avoiding judicial judgments repudiating the vision or values held by particular
elements of a diverse society, but without criticizing the breadth of the holding in

Loving).
163. See Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a

Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24
(1993).

SETON HALL

L. REv. 736, 741-42

164. While Dred Scott was neither uniformly celebrated by judges and commentators, nor uniformly reviled by the broader public, its adverse effect on system legitimacy seems clear. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857). The authors of a leading casebook note that "[i]t is generally acknowledged that Dred Scott is one of the great disasters in the history of the Supreme
Court." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 504 (3d ed. 1996).
The casebook authors then suggest that the case could have been resolved on

narrower jurisdictional grounds. See id. at 504-05.
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V. CONCLUSION

A judicial system seeking to legitimize itself need not invariably
mystify itself or imply that its work is more difficult and mysterious
than it really is. The opposite technique, herein examined, is also
available. Instead of seeking to discourage criticism of or resistance
to the courts because lay people are allegedly incapable of following
judicial reasoning, the courts may promote an opposite public belief.
Under this approach, the courts should supposedly not be criticized
or resisted because what they are crucially doing-merely counting or
empirically measuring-is assumed to be too neutral, too repeatable,
and too uncontroversial to attract reasonable objection.
In particular, judicial legitimacy can be constructed without referring to the major, contested battleground concepts of the day, such
as liberty, equality, autonomy, and privacy. Indeed, judicial legitimacy is more difficult to build on such obviously contested territory.
But judicial legitimacy can be built-however undeservedly or manipulatively-through careful, even unselfconscious use of the uncontroversial but vital notions of narrowness and breadth.

